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Latin America is going through a simultaneous process of
population ageing and growing predominance of precarious
employment conditions which poses a challenge for
contributory pension systems. The solvency of the basic
pillars of the unfunded system is being affected by the long-
standing decline in the number of active persons whose
contributions finance the benefits of retirees. The benefits
of the individually funded systems are sensitive to the density
of contributions needed to accumulate capital and finance
pensions for members with increasingly long life
expectancies. This study describes how this challenge
manifests itself at present and examines the responsibilities
that society must assume in order to cope with it.
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I
Introduction
Pension systems design mechanisms whose purpose is
to finance workers’ living expenses during their old age
or in the event of disability and to ensure the living
expenses of their dependents in the event of their death.
Such systems address the economic problem of setting
aside part of production for such eventualities (Barr,
2000); thus, they need to identify the sources of financing
with which to defray the cost of these benefits. These
sources may be the savings of workers and employers,
taxes for the public financing of benefits, and insurance
premiums for defraying costs in cases of disability and
death. If the systems do not include these financing and
insurance schemes, it is highly likely that many persons
will be left without any form of protection.
This study explains why the current reforms which
are based on individual savings schemes and private
insurance arrangements (Mesa-Lago, 1999) reproduce
the inequality in society and tend to detract from the
purpose of the social security system of which the
pension schemes are part. Thus, when they obtain their
finance on the basis of their members’ labour contracts,
retirement savings schemes reproduce the problems
typical of labour markets in the region. Since a
significant proportion of the working age population is
unemployed, underemployed or inactive, a system
based on such schemes for obtaining the funds needed
to provide for the main income earner’s living expenses
during old age or disability or for those of his survivors
after his death would leave many persons underinsured
or not insured at all.
How pension systems in Latin America evolve will
depend on the political will shown and on the
institutional actions taken to solve this dilemma. Their
evolution will depend on the degree of solidarity within
the system and on the type of cross subsidies built into
it in order to transfer resources from those who have
greater capacity to save to those who have less. Society
needs to define the redistributive role of the system and
to consider how it will be implemented: whether
redistribution will be done within the system (through
solidary contributions) or from outside of it (through
general taxes), but always avoiding the moral hazard
that those who can save may take advantage of
subsidies.
In order to highlight the importance of this link
with the inequalities associated with labour markets,
this essay will examine the following aspects: the
demographic, economic and labour context in which
the systems operate (section II); the functions that the
systems should fulfill in these contexts (section III);
the basic options for designing the fundamental pillars
of these systems (section (IV); the most extreme types
of pillars that can be constructed (section V);
heterogeneity in terms of access to the benefits
provided by pillars based on individual saving (section
VI); the liabilities associated with the different options
(section VII); the results currently being observed in
systems with pillars based on individual saving




The labour market limits the population coverage of
pension schemes in Latin America. In this respect, three
aspects of this context which contribute to this situation
may be distinguished.
Firstly, the rapid pace of population ageing has
positive and negative elements. On the positive side, the
working age population that is participating in the
economy (the potentially active population that has the
This study was prepared for the Workshop on the Economy
and Population Ageing (Mexico City, 16-17 May 2002), organized
by the Inter-American Centre for Social Security Studies (CIESS),
El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF) and the National
Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). The author wishes to
express his gratitude for the comments of Dra. Patricia Olave during
the workshop and those of Oscar Altimir on a first draft, as well as
the valuable support provided by Nora Ruedi in the preparation of
the present version, but he himself bears sole responsibility for the
contents of this work.
41C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 8  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 2
LABOUR MARKETS AND PENSION SYSTEMS  •  ANDRAS UTHOFF
capacity to save) is continuing to grow. Another positive
fact is that the total number of persons dependent on this
population (children of school age, adults who are
unemployed and inactive elderly persons) is going down.
However, the retirement-age population is growing steadily
(see right-hand column in figure 1). This quantitative
indicator of population ageing is rising sharply and will
start to gather still more momentum as from 2020.
Secondly, the economies are operating with savings
and investment levels of around 20% of GDP, which are
very low for the needs of the region. According to
ECLAC studies, such levels are too low to sustain the
pace of growth required in order to provide full
employment for all economically active persons
(ECLAC, 1996). Furthermore, it is observed that when
economies are able to attract financing from abroad in
the form of external savings (increase in financing with
external capital), this does not complement national
savings, but reduces domestic saving. Thus, the two
sources of financing tend to take each other’s place
(Titelman and Uthoff, 1997, and figure 2).
Thirdly, as pointed out in ECLAC studies, economic
growth has been dependent mainly on external financing,
the sources of which have been highly volatile. This,
together with the procyclical character of macroeconomic
policies in the region, has been reflected in unusually
frequent financial crises and in low and unstable economic
growth with significant costs in terms of unemployment
and poverty (Ocampo, coord., 2001). As already indicated
by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and ECLAC,
those who have jobs are subject to increasingly precarious
conditions which are reflected in higher rates of
unemployment, informality and lack of social protection.
Unemployment rates (which show the numbers of
unemployed among the economically active population)
are rising (figure 3) and furthermore, the year 2002 was
not very promising in this regard, since unemployment
rates were of the order of 9%.
Increasing numbers of those who have jobs now work
in the informal sector. This is because of the downturn in
formal public employment and because job creation in
large enterprises grows more slowly than the total labour
force looking for work. In Latin America, therefore, most
of the employed are tending to be in the informal sector,
obviously without social security coverage.
FIGURE 1
Latin America: Demographic dependency
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FIGURE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean: Gross national saving, external saving and real investment
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Source: ECLAC/CELADE, 1999 and 2002.
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III
The functions of pension systems
Within this context, what the reforms are trying to do
is to develop a system that fulfils two types of functions:
economic and social. The fundamental social function
is to ensure the savings (production) necessary for
financing satisfactory levels of consumption during old
age, disability and survival. Another important function
is that of contributing to equity through solidarity with
those who are not in a position to save for their old age.
Persons who are unable to save on account of their
particular employment status will also grow old one
day, and the systems which are designed must decide
how to provide for these people. Will they have access
to a pension? And if so, under what conditions and how
will it be financed?
Such functions obviously cannot be promoted,
however, through measures that involve restrictions and
a deterioration in economic objectives such as public-
sector solvency or the cost of hiring labour. This would
occur if, for example, in order to improve coverage,
there was a significant increase in contributions and/or
the tax burden or fiscal deficit. If we build solidarity
into the system, we must identify the source of the
solidary funding so that it remains consistent with the
objectives of competitiveness and economic solvency.
FIGURE 4









































































































These economic functions are important and act as
conditioning factors for the fulfillment of the social
functions pursued.
Contributions to financial savings and to the
development of capital markets are sometimes included
among the economic functions, and indeed these
objectives have been cited a great deal in connection
with the individual capitalization model. Highlighting
them, however, tends to confuse a means, such as
saving, with an end, namely, social protection. Thus,
desirable though such objectives may be in themselves,
they must be secondary to the design of the system,
although they do not by the same token cease to be
important. As we will see below, it is not clear either
that individual capitalization systems are fulfilling the
function of increasing real investment. There is financial
saving, but this does not necessarily constitute real
investment. Furthermore, in cases where such systems
take the place of an unfunded system, the cost of
transition has to be financed. 1
1
 See Orszag and Stiglitz (1999) and Barr (2000) for a study of the
myths that exist in connection with these issues.
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IV
Options for designing a pension system
In order to ensure that families set aside a portion of
their income as savings for old age, pension systems
need to have some idea of their consumption patterns
in relation to their current disposable income and its
future variations. Since the decision that has to be taken
will depend on the income expectations throughout the
life of the main income earner, it is said to be
intertemporal in character.
The life-cycle theory assumes that a person has an
income profile (represented by the gray line in figure 5),
which begins when the person enters the labour force,
grows up to a certain point and then wanes until it
disappears altogether when the person retires or stops
working. However, it also assumes that there are conditions
for maintaining a relatively stable and, it is to be hoped,
increasing level of consumption throughout the life cycle.
But this requires a pension system that promotes saving
for old age during the income-earning years.
Systems that are financed through the worker’s
contributions are based on this theory and assume that
there is a will to obtain a merit good (such as correcting
short-sightedness as far as saving for old age is
concerned) through the design of a mechanism whereby
the State, during the active life of the pension scheme
member, taps into the individual’s current income in
the form of a tax or social security contribution and
sets aside the amount thus withdrawn to finance the
system that will support that person’s living expenses
during old age. This contribution to the financing of
the system is easier to obtain from formal workers and
can be designed by resorting to different options with
respect to:
i) The type of scheme, which can be based on defined
contributions or defined benefits.
ii) The financing mechanism, which can be fully
funded or unfunded, the latter with different
premiums (for permitting actuarial adjustments and
in extreme cases a simple unfunded arrangement).
iii) The form of administration, which can be public
or private or a mixture of the two; and
iv) Participation, which can be mandatory or
voluntary.2
In contributory schemes financed by the unfunded
method, the benefits are usually defined not by a close
relation with the amounts contributed but by length of
membership and a rule that determines the pension on
the basis of a rate corresponding to the last or best
taxable wages. In contributory fully funded systems,
the contributions are usually fixed and the amount
accrued determines the benefits on the basis of actuarial
criteria regarding life expectancy at the time of
retirement. It is interesting to note that this last criterion
is being applied in unfunded systems, through the
notional capitalization models implemented recently in
Brazil (Carvalho Pinheiro and Paiva Vieira, 2000).
However, there are also pension systems that finance
the benefits without direct contributions by beneficiaries.
The State finances the payment of retirement benefits
for eligible persons out of general income and
consumption taxes which bring in revenue for the fiscal
budget. An extreme case of this type of system is the
New Zealand model, which sets a universal fixed pension:
this pension, which is adjusted in accordance with the
price index and bears a relationship with the average
wage paid in the economy, is payable to all citizens over
the age of 65 whatever their employment status during
their lives and is financed entirely out of general taxes
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Source:  Prepared by the author.
2
 It is very easy to say that an independent or informal worker
should participate voluntarily and that if he does not, then it is his
problem and he should consequently be left out of the system. This
argument could be used to justify the exclusion of many who are
nevertheless going to need income when they retire.
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V
Pension schemes: two extreme cases
Fully funded or individual saving pension plans
combine some or all of the following characteristics:
i) They are contributory: that is, financed out of
workers’ contributions.
ii) They are based on defined contributions: the
benefit depends on the savings accrued.
iii) They are funded through individual capitalization.
iv) They are privately managed only in relation to the
capitalization of savings.
v) They are obligatory only for dependent workers
and not for own-account workers.
vi) The State plays a fundamental role insofar as it
continues to be responsible for operating the system:
it acts as regulator and supervisor of pension fund
administration companies and can also play a
distributional role in order to give coverage to those
who do not manage to save enough and who are
entitled to a minimum or welfare pension.
Universal coverage schemes, such as that of New
Zealand, display some or all of the characteristics listed
below:
i) They are non-contributory: they are funded through
general taxes (consumption or income tax).
ii) They provide defined, universal and equal benefits
for all: in New Zealand, after the age of 65 years
and subject to certain residence conditions, all
citizens receive a universal pension guaranteed by
the State.
iii) They are based on the unfunded system and are
paid for out of general taxes collected from the
current generation.
iv) They are publicly administered.
v) The system is universal for all residents: it does
not exclude anyone and is the same for all.
vi) The private sector fulfils a fundamental role as it
is responsible for designing a voluntary,
complementary savings scheme for those who wish
to obtain greater benefits than those guaranteed by
the State.
Different combinations of the above
characteristics have permitted the design of two totally
opposite schemes, such as that of New Zealand and
that of Chile. The New Zealand scheme ensures that
all persons have a guaranteed pension and the private
sector plays a complementary role: that of promoting
additional voluntary saving mechanisms. The Chilean
scheme is concerned with compulsory saving, and it
is the State that has a subsidiary role. As will be seen
in section VIII below, there are many other possible
combinations. Here we have illustrated just two
extreme cases.
VI
Heterogeneity of access to a pension
system based on saving capacity
A contributory system based exclusively on individual
capacity to save for old age will tend to reproduce within
the field of social protection the uncertainties and
restrictions that limited the person in question during
the active phase of his life cycle. We will thus be
reproducing in the social protection system the very
factors that the system should counteract.
Many families live with cash flow problems and
are incapable of borrowing against future income and
of saving for provident purposes, generally because
their levels of current and future income are too low or
erratic to sustain continuous levels of saving or because
agents of loan markets perceive that these persons will
have difficulties in meeting loan repayments, since they
do not have suitable collateral to back up the credit.
Older persons in such households reach retirement age
without savings for their old age and without the income
necessary for their own living expenses.
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In countries where there are mandatory retirement
saving schemes, the poorer the family the lower their
participation tends to be, especially in the case of
women. This occurs not only because of the limited
saving capacity already mentioned, but also because in
the jobs that these persons have access to, it is not
possible to enforce labour legislation properly and many
people end up without retirement savings and thus
without an income to meet their living expenses in their
senior years. Figure 6 shows contributors to the private
pension scheme in Chile, grouped together by poverty
level, sex and age. It can be clearly seen there that if
the criterion for entitlement to benefits is the fulfillment
of defined contributions –that is, participation as a saver
in the system– this would mean that most women as
well as the active members of the poorest families,
whose participation in economic activity is more
insecure, so that they are less likely to keep up their
status as members of the system, would be left without
benefits (that is to say, without coverage). Furthermore,
many of those who, although they appear on the list of
contributors at a given time, do not participate regularly
 
FIGURE 6
Chile: contributors by poverty level, age and gender
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and therefore have a low density of contribution (saving
frequency) will also be left without coverage. The same
would apply to those who may have contributed
regularly but on the basis of very low incomes.
Because of the nature of their financing formula,
systems that are designed on the basis of families’
saving capacity will limit access to benefits as follows:
i) Uninsured without capacity to save. The most
extreme case is that of poor families who have to live
exclusively on a subsistence income. They have no
access to loan markets and therefore face permanent
cash flow problems, so that they adjust their living
expenses to a subsistence level that matches their current
income. Their situation does not change substantially
with the cycle, except that there are more and more
families joining their ranks. They have no capacity to
save and should be the subject of welfare policies as
regards saving for old age.
ii) Highly vulnerable uninsured persons. Next on
an ascending scale are those families which have been
able to escape from the situation of living at subsistence
levels and can earmark part of their current income for
savings, but because of their vulnerability to the
economic cycle and unemployment, they must adjust
their expenditure to subsistence levels, interrupting their
saving efforts time and again, so that they may never
be able to save on a continuous basis at a level that
guarantees them a decent pension for their old age.
These persons will also be candidates for welfare
pensions.
iii) Partially insured owing to their vulnerability.
Next on the scale are those families that are still
vulnerable to the situation of the economic cycle and
must adjust their expenses to conditions of uncertainty
and liquidity restrictions, albeit to a lesser degree, and
that manage to save satisfactorily in terms of continuity
but not in terms of the amount needed to afford them a
decent pension. For this reason they too will be
candidates for support through minimum pensions.
iv) Fully insured because of their saving capacity.
Lastly, there is a higher income, more highly skilled
group which is less vulnerable to the economic cycle.
Part of their income can be set aside as savings on a
continuous basis and in greater amounts that will be
sufficient to self-finance their living expenses (old-age
pension) at a satisfactory level.
VII
Contingent liabilities and system design options
The options for designing systems are not neutral and
force the representatives of society to take a decision
on the type of objectives they are pursuing. The design
has enormous repercussions on the way the system’s
social and economic functions are harmonized.
Non-contributory defined benefit models,
administered by distribution (unfunded systems), which
draw on general State-administered tax revenue and are
obligatory for all residents of the country can be the
basis for a universal, equal and solidary system. Their
success will depend on their capacity to ensure a
satisfactory income for all citizens of retirement age,
not only those that contributed to economic activity,
thereby attenuating income inequality among retirees
and protecting the latter against the uncertainty of
sudden social and economic changes. While the accent
is on the social function, in ensuring universal access
to benefits, such systems are only acceptable and
fiscally responsible if the benefits can be funded
sustainably over time.
The model applied in New Zealand places
emphasis on equity and universality, guaranteeing
access to income for the retirement years on the
strength of a person’s having been a citizen for more
than 10 years and having contributed in some way to
society, without distinction. However, the financing
of this model generates a heavy fiscal burden and does
not contribute to the development of capital markets.
When financing comes from consumption taxes it may
be regressive, but the fact that it is used for equal
pensions which are taxable makes it possible in the
end to recover part of the cost through the taxation of
higher income earners. Since the system is non-
contributory, it has the advantage of minimizing
distortions that prevent the hiring of labour. Pensions
are adjusted in line with inflation but cannot be below
65% of the average wage. The cost of this benefit
amounted to 5% of GDP in 2000 and is expected to be
rather less than 11% in 2050 (St. John and Willmore,
2001).
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Preliminary illustrative calculations for this option
for some Latin American countries are given in table 1.
They show that the model is sensitive not only to the
proportion of persons over 65 years of age but also,
and in particular, to the amount of the benefit, which in
this case is estimated as being equivalent to the
minimum wage and whose “generosity” can be seen in
relation to per capita GDP. The economic cost to
countries of sustaining this option (measured as a
percentage of GDP) depends not only on the proportion
of the population over 65 years of age but also, and
especially, on the relative generosity of the benefit,
measured in terms of the relationship between the
minimum wage and per capita GDP. An extreme example
is that of Paraguay, where population ageing is incipient
but the minimum wage is high (table 1 and figure 7).
At the other extreme is a system that rewards
individual effort to finance a pension on the basis of
savings accrued during one’s active life. This does not
place the accent on the social function, since it does
not guarantee universal coverage and the benefit differs
between individuals, with large numbers running the
risk of being left without insurance. It is based on
defined contributions with individual capitalization. In
order to contribute to the development of the capital
market, there must be an initial phase (until a whole
generation joins the system) with high transition costs,
which imply significant fiscal responsibilities. The
pension provided under this system is based on savings.
If these are low –lower than the established guarantees–
it can have the effect of shifting many towards the State-
subsidized benefits, thus affecting the solvency of the
fiscal accounts.
The Chilean model is similar to this alternative,
since it distinguishes between those who have the
capacity to save and those who do not and, from among
the former, it selects those who can be made to
contribute by the State and in respect of whom suitable
controls can be exercised. Its creation, in replacement
of a former unfunded system, generated a heavy fiscal
burden to cover the transition costs involved in the
payment of current pensions and the recognition of
contributions made to the old system by those who have
transferred to the new. In addition, it has led to costs in
FIGURE 7









































































“Generosity” = Minimum pension as % of per capita GDP
Source: Table 1.
TABLE 1
Latin America: The challenge of financing a universal pension scheme
(For 2001 data)
Amount of Percentage of Pension as a Cost as a
Country pension population percentage of percentage
(dollars) over 65 per capita GDP of GDP
Argentina 200.1 9.7 2.8 3.3
Bolivia 60.5 4.1 6.5 3.2
Brazil 73.3 5.3 2.4 1.6
Chile 162.5 7.3 3.8 3.3
Colombia 124.4 4.8 6.4 3.7
Ecuador 121.0 4.8 8.7 5.0
Mexico 106.6 4.8 1.7 1.0
Paraguay 182.2 3.5 13.9 5.9
Peru 116.9 4.8 5.8 3.3
Uruguay 82.0 12.9 1.5 2.3
Venezuela 212.3 4.5 4.2 2.3
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of official ECLAC data.
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respect of the guarantees of minimum and welfare
pensions for the civil population and the pensions of
retired members of the Armed Forces.
The annual cost of the transition, the guaranteed
minimum pensions and the pensions of the Armed
Forces has been estimated at 5.5% of GDP for the first
21 years (figure 8). In the long run, the cost should
coincide with the amount corresponding to the
guarantees. This will depend on the number of persons
who are underinsured or uninsured owing to their low
levels of savings and the increase in life expectancy
and the pensions of the Armed Forces, for as long as
the latter continue with their present system of pensions.
The pensions of members who are insured are uncertain,
since they depend on the density of their contributions,
the profitability that they obtain during their period of
contribution, and their life expectancy at retirement.
Furthermore, it is necessary to deduct the fees charged
by pension fund administration companies during the
period of accumulation and the insurance premium for
obtaining a life annuity (there are also other options)
for the retirement years. The guaranteed benefits in the
form of welfare pensions and minimum pensions are
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FIGURE 8
Chile: Total social security deficit




Source: Arenas de Mesa (1999).
The impact on development of the capital market
is enhanced if the State finances this cost through higher
taxes, lower expenditure in other sectors and income
from privatization. Otherwise, the State becomes the
principal factor of absorption of the pension fund
resources, minimizing their impact on the development
of the capital market.
VIII
Current status of capitalization
schemes in Latin America
In the structural reforms of contributory models,
capitalization or fully funded plans have not always
replaced the former unfunded systems. There are four
types of models: individually funded plans that take
the place of an unfunded scheme (Chile, 1981; Bolivia,
1997; Mexico, 1997, and El Salvador, 1998); mixed
plans, where an unfunded system is supplemented with
a capitalization system (Argentina, 1994; Uruguay,
1996, and Costa Rica, 2001; parallel schemes, where
there is competition between an unfunded system and
a funded system (Colombia, 1994 and Peru, 1993), and
notional models that apply defined contribution
schemes to unfunded models (Brazil, 2000).3
There are three fundamental issues that reveal the
limitations imposed by the labour market on systems
involving individual capitalization accounts: coverage,
capital market development, and administration fees.4
1. Coverage
As may be seen from figure 9, individual capitalization
systems continue to exclude a high percentage of the
economically active population and therefore place the
burden of expanding coverage on other sources of
financing. In terms of numbers of members, a report
3
 See Mesa-Lago (1999) and Carvalho Pinheiro and Paiva Vieira
(2000).
4
 The differing characteristics of the countries in general and the
individual systems in particular, as well as the different lengths of
time they have been in existence, mean that caution should be
exercised in making any comparison.
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by the International Association of Pension Fund
Supervisory Bodies (AIOS) based on a simple average
of nine countries shows a high rate of coverage: 63.7%
of the economically active population in December
2001. However, only 27.7% of members effectively
contribute to the system: that is, approximately six out
of every 10 members do not contribute regularly to the
system. This difference between members and
contributors gives grounds for speculating that the
density with which members save in the system is very
low, so that they will not be able to accumulate sufficient
funds to finance their own pensions and will therefore
have to receive subsidies from the State in their capacity
as under- or un-insured persons who are entitled to basic
(minimum) and welfare pensions.
Figures from the Ministry of Labour of Chile
indicate that only 4% of independent workers contribute
(although in their case they are not obliged to
contribute) and that more than half of women members
contribute less than 30% of the time that they work,
compared with 40% in the case of men. Another study
for Chile indicates that most members contribute just
enough to receive the minimum State-guaranteed
pension –which today is slightly over US$ 100–
investing their resources instead in other things, such
as their children’s education or a house of their own
(El Mercurio, 2002).
2. Capital market development and profitability
Whether individual capitalization plans will contribute
effectively to the generation of employment through
the development of capital markets and will result in
more profitable pension solutions depends on many
factors. Firstly, there must be a proper context for long-
term investment decisions, characterized by inflation
that has been reined in and kept at low levels (and/or
an indexed financial system); positive but moderate real
interest rates, and a realistic exchange rate. The purpose
is to create long-term planning time frames which can
allow for the efficient allocation of capital resources
under internationally competitive conditions.
Institutional measures are also needed in the
financial sphere to generate sound competition for long-
term investment resources. These measures include
improving public sector solvency; promoting prudential
and organizational regulation of the banking system
with a view to avoiding crises, and developing securities
markets so as to facilitate transparency in risk analysis
and thus make it possible to take informed investment
decisions and protect small investors.
Both the lack of such measures and the
enforcement of strict regulations on pension funds have
so far prevented full diversification of these funds’
investment portfolios, which are concentrated to a large
extent in government debt securities. Of the total of
the funds administered by these systems, 59% is
invested in government debt securities, 18% in financial
institutions and only 8% in stocks (figure 10).
The direct impact of the funds on real investment
is uncertain. With the exception of investment in
mortgage instruments, the counterpart of which is the
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Latin America (eight countries): Composition
of administered funds
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public, there are no instruments which increase the
country’s wealth rather than purchasing already
existing assets or financing current expenditure.
Gross annual returns5 on the funds since their
creation have been high in all instances, bearing a
relationship with the rise in the value of government
debt instruments, but in the last few years sharp
reductions have been observed. While the simple
average of real historic rates of return6 is 10.4%, the
figure for January to December 2001 was only 5.9%
(figure 11). The returns for each individual will
naturally depend on the year of entry into and exit from
the individual capitalization scheme and the fund’s
profitability during this period, after deduction of
administration fees.
3. Administration fees
A very important point to note in these circumstances
is that those who contribute to a fully funded plan must
pay a series of extra charges over and above their
contribution to their individual account; these include
disability insurance, life insurance and a net
commission to cover the administration expenses of
the fund in question. According to the AIOS report, in
the region, as a percentage of their taxable salary, Latin
American workers pay average total charges of 3%, of
which 1.25% is for disability insurance and life
insurance and 1.75% for the administration fee. Pension
fund administration companies must capitalize an
average of 9% of their members’ taxable salary. The
simple average among countries for the cost of these
fees as a percentage of workers’ total contributions is
25%, and the average as a percentage of the
capitalizable contribution is 33%, although there are
substantial differences between countries.7
Bearing in mind the coverage characteristics and
the projections that indicate that many workers will
not manage to save enough to benefit from the fully
funded system, it may be wondered whether the
payment of fees to the pension fund management
companies is not a contribution that the system loses
as part of the financing and administration of the State-
guaranteed benefits.8
The question of fees has been extensively
discussed, even with regard to workers who are fully
insured under the fully funded plan. In such cases, it
is argued that the return on the worker’s contribution
differs from that of the worker’s account because it
does not take into account the cost of the fees, which
is borne by the worker. This is illustrated in the case
of Chile in table 2. Although the return on the
contribution (the extent to which the share in the total
amount of the funds administered by a pension fund
management company appreciates) between 1981 and
1999 was 11.2%, the return on different individual
accounts varied significantly depending on the level
of income and the period of contribution of each
individual. It may be concluded that members assume
the cost of the fees and the system’s financial risk in a
regressive manner. If a member has had to participate
in the system when the fees were high and returns on
investment low, he would thereby have a significantly
lower pension than another member who has
participated at times when rates of return have been
high and fees low. The situation is much worse for
members with low incomes.
5
 Without taking into account the effect of fees charged by the
administrators.
6
 That is, deflating nominal profitability for the variation in
consumer prices.
7
 In view of the different concepts and experiences, caution should
be exercised when making such comparisons.
8
 This argument loses force when the contribution and its
capitalization are used to finance part of the guarantees of workers
who are underinsured and the fee is considered as a payment for
the services of capitalizing the worker’s balance during this period.
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IX
Conclusions
The fundamental social function of a pension system
must be to achieve universal coverage, providing decent
old age and disability pensions for income-earners and
survivors’ benefits for dependents after the death of the
contributor, as well as coverage for non-income earners.
Fundamentally, the clash with the system’s economic
functions lies in the fiscal responsibilities that the State
may have to assume as a consequence of the challenge
that the design of the system may impose on it:
providing coverage for different persons, whatever their
employment situation.
A contributory unfunded scheme with a graduated
average premium and fixed benefits runs the risk of
turning into a simple unfunded system as a result of
erosion of its reserves, which may eventually call for a
high component of public financing. However, its
replacement by a system funded by individual savings
accounts does not completely obviate this tendency,
since the labour market limits the capacity of many of
its members to achieve the required contribution
density, so that they will eventually become eligible
for State guarantees whose costs must be added to those
of the transition.
Hence fiscal responsibilities do not disappear and
the State must assume several obligations, including:
– Payment of pensions currently due to retirees under
the old system.
– Payment of entitlements already acquired by
current contributors through their contributions to
the old system, when these contributors transfer to
the new system.
– Payment of State-guaranteed pensions, whether
they be minimum or welfare pensions or those due
TABLE 2
Chile: Annual rate of return on the individual account and the contribution
(Per cent)
Chilean pesos 80 500 147 954 221 930 443 861 887 722 Contribution
May 1998-April 1999 3.79 3.91 3.95 4.00 4.02 4.81
May 1996-April 1999 3.21 3.28 3.31 3.34 3.35 4.62
May 1993-April 1999 5.04 5.10 5.13 5.15 5.16 7.05
May 1987-April 1999 6.97 7.09 7.14 7.19 7.22 9.09
May 1981-April 1999 7.24 7.41 7.47 7.54 7.57 11.17
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Pension Fund Management Companies (1999).
to the Armed Forces or to other groups entitled to
them by law.
The net reserves of the old system are available
for financing these commitments.
It is hard to estimate the cost of these
responsibilities, partly because not all countries have
opted for total substitution of one system by another,
owing precisely to the very high fiscal commitments
that this would entail. Generally speaking, however,
countries have had to confront this dilemma when
designing their pension systems, and in the case of
reform, when replacing one system by another, have
had to opt for one of the following alternatives:
– Not assuming the responsibilities in question,
which has a high political cost and is prejudicial
to retirees and workers who contributed to the old
system.
– Financing them with new debt, which has a cost
for future generations and affects the public sector
demand for financial resources.
– Financing them with fiscal surpluses, which has
significant fiscal implications and affects current
generations.
Faced with these dilemmas, Argentina, Uruguay,
Colombia, Peru and Costa Rica opted for two-pillar
systems –unfunded and fully funded– and adjusted the
unfunded system to make it more viable financially,
either by raising the retirement age, increasing
contributions and/or reducing pensions. None of these
cases makes due provision for the fact that once a
capitalization fund reaches maturity:
– Many persons will nevertheless qualify to receive
minimum and/or welfare pensions, which will
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oblige the authorities to make major adjustments
in public finances or reforms of the reforms.
– Those reaching retirement age with sufficient savings
will have to adjust their benefits to rising life expectancy,
and at the same time will be forced to take decisions
relating to a higher retirement age, a reduction in benefits
or the payment of additional voluntary contributions.
In view of the heterogeneity of Latin American
societies, which is reflected particularly strongly in the
labour market, the conclusion is that further reforms to
the pension systems will be necessary. Contributory
unfunded solidary financing mechanisms must be
strengthened to give coverage to those who, through
their particular employment situation, would be left
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